A fondo: Análisis 2018 | In depth: Analysis of 2018 FuturEnviro | Febrero February 2018 www.futurenviro.es 24 man parte de los planes hidrológicos, y esta ha de ser posibilista no contemplando lo que no se puede hacer durante el periodo de su vigencia, tanto por falta de medios materiales como económicos. Alcanzado ese punto en que se puede hacer lo que se planifica, hay que asegurar que los medios económicos previstos queden vinculados a esos cometidos y en consecuencia convertir en vinculantes las partidas presupuestarias correspondientes y ejecutarlas. Esta propuesta deriva del hecho de que los planes hidrológicos actuales, denominados de segundo ciclo (2015-2021), son tan ambiciosos como incumplibles por falta de recursos económicos y de medios, máxime cuando las partidas presupuestarias no son vinculantes ni suficientes y además el grado del cumplimiento de estas es escaso. Conviene ahora plantearse otra forma de financiar las infraestructuras que entendemos complementaria de la inversión estatal. Se trata de la colaboración público-privada, que tanta tinta ha hecho y hace correr, pero que tan pocos resultados ha propiciado. Dejando a un lado la cuestión de si se gasta bien o mal, es cierto que las partidas “sociales” del presupuesto acaparan la mayor parte del mismo, pero también que hay un stock de capital público, del que forma parte el patrimonio hidráulico, necesario para el adecuado progreso, que hay que conservar e incrementar y en consecuencia dedicarle los recursos que necesita, que pueden ser públicos y o privados. Tradicionalmente le colaboración público-privada se ha desarrollado con las concesiones, sistema por el que el capital privado acomete una infraestructura y su explotación durante un largo periodo de tiempo y a cambio recibe unas compensaciones económicas que pueden venir del poder público adjudicador o de los propios usuarios. No es cuestión de discutir ahora cual es la mejor forma de compensar al concesionario, pero sí de pedir que se configure algún sistema adicional al de las concesiones que permita acometer proyectos públicos sin quebranto para las arcas públicas. En coherencia con esto queremos reivindicar la modificación del Reglamento de la Ley de Desindexación, en el sentido de que no limite el interés al concesionario en concesiones de más de 5 años de duración, que junto al presupuesto de los proyectos de agua, en general pequeño, limita mucho la práctica de las concesiones como sistemas de inversión. A comienzos del mes de marzo de 2018, entró en vigor la Ley de Contratos del Sector Público que traspone a nuestro derecho interno las Directivas sobre contratación pública y adjudicación de contratos de concesión. Los objetivos primarios que persigue son conseguir una mayor transparencia en la contratación y una mejor relación calidad precio mediante criterios de adjudicación que incluyan aspectos cualitativos, medioambientales, sociales e innovadores vinculados al objeto del contrato para obtener obras de gran calidad. Su redacción poco atractiva, no resulta clara en bastantes As far as we are concerned, in the absence of the necessary updating of the national Hydrological Plan, there has to be a close relationship between investment and the plans set out in the river basin management plans. Investment provides the financial resources to carry out the programme of measures contained in river basin management plans. These plans must be realistic and not include what cannot be done in the period for which they are drafted, whether this is due to lack of material or financial means. In order to achieve a situation in which it is possible to carry out what is planned, it is necessary to ensure that the envisaged financial resources are allocated to these initiatives and, therefore, it must also be ensured that the corresponding budgetary provisions are binding and executed. This proposal arises from the fact that current river basin management plans, known as second-cycle plans (2015-2021) are as ambitious as they are impossible to fulfil, due to lack of financial resources and means, and more so when budgetary provisions are neither binding nor sufficient, and the degree of adherence to these provisions is very low. At this point, it would be worth examining another way of financing infrastructures, which we view as complementary to state investment.We are speaking of public-private partnership, about which much has been written, but which has provided very little in the way of results. Leaving aside the question of whether the money is spent well or badly, it is true that “social” provisions account for the greater part of budgetary expenditure. But there is also a public capital stock, including water infrastructure, needed for adequate progress and this stock must be conserved and expanded. In order to do so, the necessary resources must be allocated to it and these resources can be public and/or private. Public-private partnership has traditionally taken the form of concessions, a systemwhereby private capital is used to construct an infrastructure and operate it over a lengthy period. In exchange, the concessionaire receives payment, which may come from the public contracting body or the users themselves. It is not a question at this point in time of arguing about the best way to reimburse the concessionaire. However, it is the time to ask for the creation of another system, in addition to the concession system, that would enable public projects to be undertaken without completely depleting the public coffers. And in coherence with this request, we would also ask for reformof the Regulations associated with the Deindexation Act, so as not to limit the interest of concessionaires to concessions of over five years in duration, which, along with the generally small budgets for water projects, severely limits the use of concessions as investment systems. At the beginning of March 2018, the Public Sector Contracts Act came into effect. This act transposes Directives on public procurement and the awarding of concession contracts into Spanish law. The primary objectives of the legislation are to achieve greater transparency in procurement and better value for money through award criteria that include qualitative, environmental and social aspects, as well as innovation, with a view to obtaining infrastructure of very high quality. The rather unattractive wording of the legislation is unclear in many areas. This, allied to the fact that all legislation requires polishing on being put into practice, leads us to predict a great deal of work for the Spanish Administrative Tribunal for Contractual Appeals, the Public Procurement Advisory Board, equivalent regional bodies and the administrative courts.We hope that the possibilities offered by the legislation are availed of by contracting authorities to achieve tender documents that
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